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Many prominent studies of infant cognition over the past two decades have relied on the fact 
that infants habituate to repeated stimuli – i.e. that their looking times tend to decline upon 
repeated stimulus presentations. This phenomenon had been exploited to reveal a great deal 
about the minds of preverbal infants. Many prominent studies of the neural bases of adult 
cognition over the past decade have relied on the fact that brain regions habituate to repeated 
stimuli – i.e. that the hemodynamic responses observed in fMRI tend to decline upon repeated 
stimulus presentations. This phenomenon has been exploited to reveal a great deal about the 
neural mechanisms of perception and cognition. Similarities in the mechanics of these two 
forms of habituation suggest that it may be useful to relate them to each other. Here we outline 
this analogy, explore its nuances, and highlight some ways in which the study of habituation 
in functional neuroimaging could yield novel insights into the nature of habituation in infant 
cognition – and vice versa.
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infant cognition were primarily interested in habituation per se as 
a measure of simple learning in the youngest infants (e.g. Kagan 
and Lewis, 1965). In such studies, a single stimulus was repeated 
several times across trials, and the change in time spent ﬁ  xating on 
the stimulus over repetitions served as the measure of habituation. 
Later studies began employing habituation as a research tool to 
investigate infants’ abilities to discriminate and remember stimuli 
(e.g. Fagan, 1970; Wetherford and Cohen, 1973; see also Bornstein, 
1985; Cohen, 1976; Olson, 1976). Critically, this approach involves 
examining patterns of ﬁ  xation for repeated vs. novel stimuli, rather 
than just the decrease in responsiveness to repeated stimuli alone. 
The visual paired comparison procedure was an early example of 
this approach: when presented with two complex visual patterns, 
infants looked longer at a new pattern compared to one that they 
had previously seen several times (Fantz, 1964). However, in this 
case it is unclear whether the increased looking reﬂ  ects a prefer-
ence for the novel stimulus or avoidance of the repeated stimulus. 
This result was nevertheless groundbreaking, as it indicated that 
infants could discriminate the two alternatives, and had memory 
for the repeated stimulus.
More standard habituation tasks have convincingly demon-
strated novelty preferences by relying on a separate test phase. In 
such designs, infants are repeatedly familiarized to a single stimu-
lus for a ﬁ  xed amount of time (e.g. Fagan, 1972), or – because of 
differences in the rate of habituation across subjects – until their 
looking time is reduced to a criterion level (typically, when the mean 
looking time over the last three trials is less than 50% of the mean 
looking time of the ﬁ  rst three trials; see Cohen and Gelber, 1975). 
After reaching this criterion, infants begin a test phase. Perhaps the 
simplest test involves comparing the looking time to the habituation 
stimulus (now repeated again during test) vs. the looking time to 
a novel stimulus that differs from the habituation stimulus along 
INTRODUCTION
An important property of the human mind is that novel informa-
tion and repeated information are treated differently. In particular, 
repeated stimuli tend to receive progressively less processing, and 
this habituation manifests itself in many ways1. While the discov-
ery of novelty-seeking behavior extends far back into the history 
of psychological science, our goal in this paper is to explore the 
relationship between two particular manifestations that have been 
exploited in rather different subﬁ  elds of cognitive science: studies 
of infant perception and cognition based on novelty preferences in 
looking time, and studies of adult perception and cognition based 
on repetition attenuation as measured with functional neuroim-
aging. The ﬁ  rst two sections of this paper selectively review these 
two varieties of habituation, and the third section notes a nuanced 
set of similarities between them. The ﬁ  nal section then explores 
ways in which the study of habituation in functional neuroimaging 
could yield novel insights into the nature of habituation in infant 
cognition – and vice versa.
HABITUATION IN INFANT COGNITION
Infants tend to look longer at novel stimuli than at repeated 
stimuli (for a recent review, see Aslin, 2007)2. Initial studies in 
Edited by:
Silvia A. Bunge, University of California 
Berkeley, USA
Reviewed by:
Leslie J. Carver, University of California, 
San Diego, USA
Scott P . Johnson, University of 
California, USA
*Correspondence:
Nicholas B. Turk-Browne, Department 
of Psychology, Yale University, 
2 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven 
CT 06511, USA. e-mail: nicholas.
turk-browne@yale.edu
1As will become clear below, we use the procedural term “habituation” in a general 
sense in this paper, abstracting away from how it has been operationalized in 
speciﬁ  c domains, and without any quantitative assumptions about how much 
repetition is required. Moreover, while habituation refers to the process underlying 
decreased responsiveness itself, most studies that employ habituation instead 
examine the consequences of this process for subsequent processing of novel and 
familiar stimuli.
2This general avoidance of repeated information and exploration of novel 
information can be observed in many other types of responses in infants, including 
heart rate, respiration, startle, and sucking, but here we primarily focus on patterns 
of looking times as the dependent measure.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2008  | Volume 2  |  Article 16  |  2
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some dimension, such as stimulus orientation or face identity. If the 
infant represents this dimension, perceives the difference, and ﬁ  nds 
the difference to be salient, they will exhibit a novelty preference by 
looking longer at the novel stimulus (sometimes called dishabitua-
tion). The novelty preference is quantiﬁ  ed as the amount of extra 
time that the infant ﬁ  xated the novel stimulus compared to the 
familiar stimulus, across trials. Since any systematic preference of 
this sort would only be possible if the infant can discriminate the 
two stimuli, this technique has been used extensively to describe the 
perceptual abilities of infants – for example revealing their ability 
to discriminate orientation (e.g. Atkinson et al., 1988) or faces (e.g. 
Young-Browne et al., 1977).
Novelty preferences have also been used to study other types 
of more complex perceptual and conceptual abilities. In many of 
these studies, the test phase consists of two stimuli that each differ 
from the familiarized stimulus along some of the same perceptual 
dimensions, but differ from each other along a critical additional 
dimension. Again, if infants discriminate this critical dimension, 
then they may look longer at the stimulus that is novel in this 
key respect. For example, this technique has been used to explore 
infants’ understanding of simple physical principles – that objects 
exist even when unseen (the idea of “object permanence”), and 
cannot pass through each other (e.g. Baillargeon, 1987; Baillargeon 
et al., 1985; Spelke et al., 1992).
In one such study (Baillargeon, 1987), young infants were 
familiarized to a display in which a screen lying ﬂ  at and facing the 
infant rotated up and away from the infant 180° in the manner of a 
 drawbridge (Figure 1A). This motion repeated until a  habituation 
criterion was reached. At test, a new object was then placed at the 
far edge of the screen, which either did or did not interact with 
the rotating screen. In “impossible” test displays, the screen moved 
exactly as during familiarization, appearing to rotate right through 
the object. In “possible” test displays, the screen rotated only to the 
point where adults would expect it to contact the object and stop 
moving. Thus, both test displays were novel (containing a new 
object), but the “possible” event was more  perceptually novel (con-
taining a different screen rotation). Thus, if infants exhibit a per-
ceptual novelty preference, they should look longer at the possible 
event. However, if they can discriminate the more abstract change 
(i.e. that the screen violated the principle of object permanence), 
and if they ﬁ  nd this abstract change to be especially salient, then 
their looking times should increase to the impossible event. Indeed, 
infants looked longer at the “impossible” test trials (Figure 1B) – 
which was interpreted in terms of a violation of infants’ expecta-
tions regarding solidity and/or object permanence.
Similar  violation-of-expectation studies using looking-time 
  measures have explored many cognitive abilities of preverbal 
infants, in some cases without using a separate familiarization phase 
(e.g. Baillargeon, 2000; Wang et al., 2004). For example, one such 
study examined infants’ simple arithmetic abilities (Wynn, 1992). 
In an “addition” condition, infants were presented with a single 
  familiarization event in which a doll appeared on a stage, a screen 
A B
FIGURE 1 | An example of habituation in infant cognition (adapted from 
Baillargeon, 1987). (A) Side view of habituation and test displays. In both 
conditions, infants were habituated to a 180° drawbridge-like motion. The 
decline and plateau of looking times during habituation are depicted in the left 
panels of (B). In the Experimental Condition, infants completed two types of 
test trials, both of which contained a new object on the far side of the display 
(depicted by the black box). The Impossible Test involved the same full 
180° rotation from habituation, but now the screen surprisingly passed through 
the box as it completed its rotation (with the box disappearing as it became 
obscured). The Possible Test involved a novel shorter rotation of screen up to 
the point where it would contact the box, where it stopped; this motion was 
“possible” in terms of solidity and object permanence, but was more 
perceptually novel than the Impossible Test. In the Control Condition, the 
screen rotations were identical, but no new object was presented (such that 
both motions were equally possible). Within each condition, the two types of 
test trials were alternated, with order counterbalanced across infants. The 
results from the test phase are depicted in the right panels of (B). In the 
Experimental Condition, infants dishabituated to the Impossible Test 
but not the Possible Test. However, in the Control Condition no preference 
was observed. These results were interpreted as reﬂ  ecting the 
violation of infants’ expectations regarding solidity and/or 
object permanence.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2008  | Volume 2  |  Article 16  |  3
Turk-Browne et al.  Habituation in babies and brains
rotated up and covered part of the stage, then another doll was 
placed behind the screen. The screen was then removed to reveal 
either one or two dolls on the stage. Infants looked longer at the 
single doll display, which was interpreted in terms of the arithmetic 
expectation that 1 + 1 = 2. Similar evidence of arithmetic compe-
tence was found with 1 + 1 = 2-or-3 and 2 − 1 = 1-or-2 conditions. 
There has been substantial debate about how these studies that 
employ limited familiarization (e.g. Wynn, 1992) relate to those in 
which infants are habituated to criterion (e.g. Baillargeon, 1987). 
In particular, it has been argued that looking times following lim-
ited familiarization may reﬂ  ect perceptual familiarity preferences 
rather than conceptual novelty preferences (e.g. Bogartz et al., 1997; 
Cohen and Marks, 2002). Nevertheless, we mention violation-of-
expectation studies here because they do often involve a similar 
design with repeated vs. novel displays.
These studies collectively illustrate the power of habituation and 
novelty preferences as phenomena that have been exploited to make 
inferences about infants’ perceptual and cognitive abilities.
HABITUATION IN FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING
Neural responses tend to be stronger to novel information than to 
repeated information (for recent reviews, see Grill-Spector et al., 
2006; Krekelberg et al., 2006; Schacter et al., 2007). This effect was 
initially observed in terms of reduced ﬁ  ring rates in single unit 
recordings from macaque inferior temporal cortex (e.g. Baylis and 
Rolls, 1987; Brown et al., 1987; Li et al., 1993; Miller and Desimone, 
1994), but we will largely focus here on analogous effects observed in 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of human adults – 
the phenomenon of repetition attenuation. In typical studies of 
rapid repetition attenuation (often called fMR-adaptation), each 
trial contains two images presented 300–500 ms apart. Following 
the presentation of the ﬁ  rst image – which serves to familiarize the 
observer to the stimulus – the second image is either identical to 
the ﬁ  rst image (repeated) or different along some dimension under 
investigation (novel). For example, the two images may have identi-
cal or different local contours (Figure 2A). Given the poor tempo-
ral resolution of fMRI, the aggregated hemodynamic response to 
both images is then analyzed. Repetition attenuation can then be 
 quantiﬁ  ed as the difference in the hemodynamic response between 
trials containing identical vs. different images.
Because fMRI typically provides data from many regions in the 
brain, we can consider how brain regions differ with respect to 
the amount of repetition attenuation they exhibit. In the example 
depicted in Figure 2A, if a population of neurons in one region does 
A B
FIGURE 2 | An example of habituation in functional neuroimaging 
(adapted from Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2001). (A) In each trial, two stimuli 
were presented sequentially (each for 300 ms with a 400 ms pause in 
between). The stimuli were simple shapes presented behind or in front of 
three partially occluding bars. In the Repeated trials, the same shape was 
repeated at the same depth with respect to the occluders. In the Novel 
Contour trials, the same shape was repeated, but moved in depth with respect 
to the occluders, such that the local visible contours changed. In the Novel 
Contour + Shape trials, a different shape was presented as the second 
stimulus, also moved in depth with respect to the occluders. (B) Event-related 
fMRI responses to the pairs of stimuli in a region of ventral visual cortex that 
responds more strongly to objects than to other stimulus patterns (lateral 
occipital complex; LOC). The response to the Novel Contour trials was the 
same as the response to the Repeated trials, demonstrating that the LOC 
does not represent visible local contours per se. However, the responses to 
both of these conditions were attenuated relative to the response to the Novel 
Contour + Shape condition. These results suggest that the LOC represents 
perceived shape rather than local contours.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2008  | Volume 2  |  Article 16  |  4
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not represent local contours (such that it cannot discriminate two 
images on the basis of these contours), the fMRI response in this 
region will be the same for trials containing identical vs. different 
contours, and thus there will be no repetition attenuation. The 
same neuronal population may represent some other property of 
the stimuli (such that, for example, it can discriminate between two 
images on the basis of perceived shape); in these cases, the fMRI 
response in this region will be reduced for trials containing identical 
vs. different shapes, and thus exhibit repetition attenuation. Both 
of these patterns are apparent in Figure 2B (adapted from Kourtzi 
and Kanwisher, 2001).
Repetition attenuation is not an all-or-none affair, of course: 
the amount of attenuation within a particular brain region is 
  proportional to the degree of selectivity along a given dimension 
and the magnitude of the difference between two stimuli along 
that dimension. For example, representations of objects in the lat-
eral occipital complex (LOC; Malach et al., 1995) are   orientation-
 speciﬁ  c: rotating an identical object 15° elicits a greater fMRI 
response (i.e. less repetition attenuation) than if the object had been 
repeated in its original orientation, but rotating an identical object 
45° elicits an even greater response (Murray and Wojciulik, 2004). 
Similar parametric methods have also been used to study aspects of 
cognition, for example revealing a representation of approximate 
number in intraparietal sulcus (Piazza et al., 2004), and revealing 
a representation of how similar another person is to oneself in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Jenkins et al., 2008).
Repetition attenuation is a prevalent consequence of stimulus 
repetition, and can be observed in modalities other than vision 
(e.g. Bergerbest et al., 2004; Dehaene-Lambertz et al., 2006), and in 
various brain regions (e.g. Breiter et al., 1996; Jenkins et al., 2008; 
Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). Moreover, it is not limited to situ-
ations in which the repeated stimulus is presented immediately 
following the initial stimulus. In fact, attenuated hemodynamic 
responses to repeated stimuli can be observed after one or more 
interleaved novel stimuli (e.g. Turk-Browne et al., 2006), or after 
signiﬁ  cant interference (e.g. Henson et al., 2004) and delays (van 
Turennout et al., 2000). In these cases, hemodynamic responses are 
individually estimated for the repeated stimulus (rather than the 
pair, as in the rapid repetition case described above) and compared 
to the hemodynamic responses for novel stimuli that are presented 
during that same phase of the experiment. However, note that rep-
etition attenuation is not universal, and many factors contribute 
to whether or not it will be observed, including selective attention 
(e.g. Yi and Chun, 2005), task context (e.g. Dobbins et al., 2004; cf. 
Xu et al., 2007) and explicit recognition (e.g. Schott et al., 2005). 
Thus, repetition attenuation is most readily observed when stimuli 
are attended, but repetitions can nevertheless be incidental to the 
task at hand (e.g. during orthogonal categorization judgments; 
Dobbins et al., 2004; Turk-Browne et al., 2006).
These examples collectively illustrate the power of habituation in 
adult cognitive neuroscience as a phenomenon that can be exploited 
to make inferences about the nature of perceptual and cognitive 
representations.
THE ANALOGY
The two types of habituation described above are superﬁ  cially simi-
lar, each reﬂ  ecting a type of decreased responsiveness to repeated 
stimuli. In the case of infant cognition, infants may be repeatedly 
familiarized to a stimulus until a preset habituation criterion is 
met. They are then presented with test stimuli that are more or 
less similar to the familiarized stimulus in various ways. Looking-
time preferences for novel stimuli over repeated stimuli serve as 
the primary dependent measure, and indicate both that the infant 
can discriminate along the dimension that distinguishes the test 
items, and that they have memory for the repeated stimulus. In 
the case of functional neuroimaging, observers are familiarized to 
an initial stimulus (typically once, but up to three or more times; 
e.g. Dobbins et al., 2004; Grill-Spector et al., 1999). They are then 
presented with a second test stimulus that is more or less similar 
to the initial stimulus. Attenuated hemodynamic responses within 
a brain region for repeated stimuli serve as the primary dependent 
measure, and indicate both that the brain region can discriminate 
the test items, and that it has represented the repeated stimulus. 
Thus, both novelty preferences and repetition attenuation reﬂ  ect 
increased processing of new information3.
Given that these two subﬁ  elds of cognitive science have been 
using similar phenomena as tools to explore similar issues, it is 
unfortunate that they have typically been treated in isolation. To 
our knowledge, previous explorations of infant habituation have 
almost never discussed fMRI repetition attenuation, and vice versa. 
We think, however, that a theoretical comparison of these two litera-
tures is instructive, since the analogies run deep. Below we review 
three of these analogies that seem particularly useful to consider in 
the context of relating these two literatures. It is possible that these 
analogies suggest a common underlying mechanism for these two 
forms of habituation, but we will argue that comparing these two 
literatures is of considerable use and interest even if different but 
analogous mechanisms are involved.
MEASUREMENT SENSITIVITY
A ﬁ  rst similarity worth mentioning relates to the development of 
each method: these forms of habituation have each achieved their 
prominence largely as a result of the increased sensitivity they afford 
over other methods. This is especially salient in infant cognition, 
where looking-time measures proved more sensitive than previous 
methods based on overt action and manipulation. For example, 
Piaget (1954) famously suggested that object permanence did not 
develop until 18–24 months, as indicated by younger infants’ fail-
ures to search for hidden objects – but this implication was belied 
by later looking-time experiments, such as those described above. 
Looking-times, in other words, seem to constitute a better measure 
of underlying competence, and “it is no exaggeration to say that 
without looking time measures, we would know very little about 
nearly any aspect of infant development” (Aslin, 2007, p. 48).
Habituation methods in functional neuroimaging have similarly 
become prominent in part because they afford a degree of sensi-
tivity that is difﬁ  cult to obtain with other methods. For example, 
3The interpretation of habituation data can depend critically on the stage of 
development, ranging from simple perceptual abilities that can affect how well 
a habituation stimulus is resolved, to more advanced cognitive abilities such as 
working memory and language that may support or confound performance in a 
particular experimental protocol. Note, however, that in this section we focus on 
theoretical analogies, rather than more speciﬁ  c developmental comparisons of, for 
example, how fast or to what properties infants vs. adults habituate.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2008  | Volume 2  |  Article 16  |  5
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due to limitations in spatial resolution, traditional neuroimaging 
methods average over the ﬁ  ne-grained representational structure of 
visual cortex (e.g. Hubel and Wiesel, 1977; Tanaka, 1996). However, 
repetition-based methods afford higher functional resolution: if 
habituation is observed within a particular voxel when a stimulus is 
repeated, one can infer that a subpopulation of neurons within this 
region is tuned to the stimulus. For example, in an fMRI study of 
face processing (Winston et al., 2004), conventional localizer scans 
demonstrated that both the fusiform face area (FFA; Kanwisher 
et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997) and the anterior superior tempo-
ral sulcus respond more strongly to faces than to other objects – and 
are thus face-selective in a classical sense – but repetition attenuation 
revealed that these areas process different aspects of faces: the FFA 
exhibited repetition attenuation when the identity of a face was 
repeated vs. changed, suggesting that this region represents facial 
identities – but the STS exhibited repetition attenuation when the 
expression of a face was repeated vs. changed, suggesting that this 
region represents different facial expressions.
Note that this example also illustrates the sensitivity of repeti-
tion attenuation methods in a different way, since it would not be 
possible to obtain such results without this phenomenon. It is true 
that, by using more classical subtraction techniques, one could 
simply contrast blocks of neutral faces with blocks of emotional 
faces. This would yield activation in the fusiform to both blocks 
(perhaps relative to ﬁ  xation or to another category of stimuli such 
as line-drawings or houses), and enhanced activation in the STS 
for the emotional vs. neutral faces. One could then (unjustiﬁ  ably) 
interpret these results as demonstrating that the fusiform is involved 
in processing identity and that the STS is involved in processing 
expression. However, repetition designs provide more speciﬁ  c 
information about both regions. (1) In the fusiform, observing 
activation for blocks of faces may simply reﬂ  ect processing of dif-
ferent facial features, or even more generic holistic processing. To 
isolate “identity” one must titrate stimulus conditions such that 
they differ only with respect to the identity dimension – as when 
repeating blocks of same faces and blocks of different faces, and 
analyzing the resulting differential repetition attenuation (Grill-
Spector et al., 1999). One can even divorce identity from perceptual 
similarity by combining repetition attenuation with face-morphing 
techniques (e.g. Rotshtein et al., 2005). (2) In the STS, increased 
activation for emotional faces vs. neutral faces may simply reﬂ  ect 
selectivity for any non-neutral facial expression, or more generic 
processing of valenced stimuli (e.g. yielding equal activation for 
blocks of angry faces vs. blocks of fearful faces). However, a repeti-
tion approach can demonstrate that the STS codes for particular 
facial expressions, by demonstrating dishabituation to an angry 
face following a fearful face, compared to a trial containing two 
fearful faces (e.g. Winston et al., 2004).
As we stress the enhanced sensitivity afforded by habituation 
techniques in infant cognition and adult cognitive neuroscience, 
note that it is not simply that such methods in isolation are more 
sensitive than some other methods. Rather, the particular questions 
that they can answer are analogous: in both domains, habituation 
techniques provide a way of indirectly probing for knowledge. This 
is particularly important in infant cognition, for both historical 
and scientiﬁ  c reasons: when other performance measures failed to 
elicit effects, theorists were led to underestimate infants’ surprising 
competence in some areas. Repetition attenuation in fMRI has also 
proven important for characterizing the multifaceted nature of 
visual representations, which are otherwise aggregated into overt 
behavioral responses and/or obscured in classical fMRI analyses. 
Thus, in both cases, habituation techniques provide more speciﬁ  c 
information about types of knowledge4.
MEMORY AND INTERRUPTIBILITY
The visual environment is inherently dynamic, and we rarely re-
encounter the same stimulus without interruption by other stimuli, 
or after some delay in time. This fact has motivated research in 
infant cognition and functional neuroimaging that attempts to 
draw the connection between habituation and memory. In func-
tional neuroimaging, attenuation can be observed to a repeated 
stimulus despite multiple intervening stimuli which themselves 
elicit normal (i.e. unhabituated) responses, even over long delays 
(van Turennout et al., 2000) and even when the interruption con-
tains other examples from the same category (e.g. Buckner et al., 
1998; Dobbins et al., 2004; Henson et al., 2000; Turk-Browne et al., 
2006). This long-lag habituation has been used to study the neu-
ral basis of repetition priming, a form of implicit memory (e.g. 
Henson, 2003; Schacter and Buckner, 1998; Schacter et al., 2007; 
Wiggs and Martin, 1998). In particular, habituation in some brain 
regions is accompanied by decreases in response time (e.g. Dobbins 
et al., 2004; Turk-Browne et al., 2007), positively correlates with the 
degree of priming (e.g. Maccotta and Buckner, 2004; Turk-Browne 
et al., 2006), and may even be causally necessary for priming to 
occur (Wig et al., 2005). Thus, habituation may reﬂ  ect the encod-
ing of long-term perceptual memory (Turk-Browne et al., 2006; 
Yi and Chun, 2005).
Habituation of looking times in infant cognition may also reﬂ  ect 
a form of implicit perceptual memory (see Nelson, 1995)5, with 
decreased looking time to familiar stimuli persisting across delays 
(e.g. Cohen et al., 1977). Moreover, infants’ representations of habit-
uated stimuli can persist despite interruptions due to   interleaved 
4Despite these beneﬁ  ts, note that habituation measures do not exhaust sensitivity. 
Two stimuli that elicit similarly habituated responses – i.e. equally attenuated 
looking times or fMRI responses – may still be discriminable. For example, certain 
properties may be more or less salient to infants (leading them to look longer, 
or not) based on whether the particular test event is categorized as a type for 
which that property is relevant (Quinn, 1987; Wang et al., 2005). Thus a failure to 
dishabituate to the novel height of an object at test may indicate not that infants 
failed to notice the difference, but that they did not consider it relevant (Wang and 
Baillargeon, 2006). The same is true in functional neuroimaging. For example, just 
because a given brain region (say, the FFA) habituates without regard for some 
property (say, facial expression), that property may nevertheless be discriminated 
both behaviorally and in other brain regions, and other methods could even 
still reveal sensitivity to that property in that same brain region (cf. Kourtzi and 
Huberle, 2005; Murray et al., 2006; Park et al., 2007).
5While novelty preferences are believed to rely on the hippocampus (McKee 
and Squire, 1993), and thus would typically be considered a form of explicit or 
declarative memory, looking-time preferences (following habituation or in a 
paired-comparison task) can be observed much earlier in development than 
explicit recognition or recall in other tasks. These results among others have led 
to speculation that orienting to novelty is obligatory in young infants, and such 
automaticity is certainly more characteristic of implicit than explicit memory 
(Nelson, 1995). As further evidence, a recent study of adults demonstrated a double-
dissociation between novelty preferences in looking time and explicit recognition, 
with classical conditioning affecting novelty preferences but not recognition 
memory, and stimulus complexity affecting recognition memory but not novelty 
preferences (Snyder et al., 2008; cf. Manns et al., 2000).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2008  | Volume 2  |  Article 16  |  6
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stimulus patterns (e.g. Cohen et al., 1977; Quinn, 1987), display 
manipulations such as the arithmetic events described earlier (e.g. 
Feigenson et al., 2002; Wynn, 1992), and even extrinsic interrup-
tions involving novel objects and events (Cheries et al., 2006). These 
illustrations of successful habituation across delays and interrup-
tions suggest that habituation is well tuned to our highly complex 
and dynamic visual environment.
FAMILIARITY: ATTENUATION VS. ENHANCEMENT
One of the most intriguing analogies between habituation in these 
two domains relates to an oversimpliﬁ  cation in the previous dis-
cussion. In our initial descriptions of habituation in both infant 
cognition and functional neuroimaging, we noted that repeated 
stimuli tend to elicit novelty preferences and repetition attenuation, 
respectively, but in fact this is not always the case. Indeed, some 
looking-time studies with infants yield familiarity preferences – i.e. 
longer looking at familiar vs. novel events (e.g. Bogartz et al., 1997, 
2000; Cashon and Cohen, 2000; Cohen and Marks, 2002; Hunt, 
1970; Richards, 1997; Roder et al., 2000; Wetherford and Cohen, 
1973). For example, when infants are brieﬂ  y familiarized to a display 
with one toy on a stage, they look longer at a test display contain-
ing one toy than at a test display containing two toys (Cohen and 
Marks, 2002). Similarly, some fMRI studies of adult visual cognition 
give rise to repetition enhancement – i.e. a stronger fMRI signal to 
repeated vs. novel events (e.g. Dolan et al., 1997; Grill-Spector et al., 
2000; Henson et al., 2000; James and Gauthier, 2006; Kourtzi et al., 
2005; Turk-Browne et al., 2007). For example, the repetition of two 
unfamiliar faces or line drawings can lead to enhanced responses 
in right fusiform cortex (Henson et al., 2000).
In some cases, this difference may not be theoretically important. 
For example, if the goal of a study simply to determine whether 
infants (or a brain area) can discriminate two stimuli, then a dif-
ferential response in either direction is sufﬁ  cient (as is the case for 
many other measures, e.g. Fiser and Aslin, 2002). In other contexts, 
however, this difference is critical – especially in infant cognition. 
For example, the interpretation of the study of infants’ arithmetic 
abilities described above (Wynn, 1992) depends on the assumption 
of a novelty preference: when infants see 1 + 1 = 2, their resulting 
longer looking at one object is taken to reﬂ  ect a violation of expecta-
tion rather than a mere familiarity preference (Cohen and Marks, 
2002). Because familiarity preferences have been observed, however, 
these interpretations have led to lively debates about the proper 
interpretation of looking-time data. Some researchers claim that the 
relevant data can be explained without appeal to “initial knowledge” 
of the world, based on familiarity preferences (e.g. Bogartz et al., 
1997; Cohen and Marks, 2002; Haith, 1998). Others have attempted 
to rebut these arguments, arguing that these interpretations cannot 
account for the full array of data in each domain (e.g. Baillargeon, 
1999; Carey, 2002; Spelke, 1998; Wynn, 2002).
Familiarity preferences and repetition enhancement are not 
commonly observed, and are seen in each literature as an excep-
tion to a general rule. Yet, because of the interpretive difﬁ  culties 
noted above, it is obviously important to determine just how and 
when familiarity vs. novelty preferences (repetition enhancement 
vs. attenuation) will arise. And strikingly, the answers here may 
be the same in both domains. In the most general terms, repeated 
stimuli may receive enhanced processing until they have been 
fully represented; at some point, diminishing returns may redirect 
processing efforts to novel stimuli. It follows then that the response 
to a stimulus that has been weakly represented should be enhanced 
relative to a novel stimulus, while the response to a stimulus that 
has been robustly represented should be attenuated relative to a 
novel stimulus. Such effects have been demonstrated in both infant 
cognition and functional neuroimaging.
In infant cognition, the likelihood of observing familiarity 
preferences vs. novelty preferences depends on a variety of fac-
tors, including age, stimulus complexity, exposure time, processing 
speed, and task difﬁ  culty (Hunter and Ames, 1988). These factors 
can all be summarized under a single organizing principle: prefer-
ence depends on the quality of the representation established by 
past experience. This point can be made especially clear by consid-
ering how the quantity of habituation affects preferences: infants 
that are fully habituated to a stimulus exhibit novelty preferences, 
while infants whose habituation has been interrupted exhibit 
familiarity preferences (e.g. Hunter et al., 1982; Roder et al., 2000; 
Rose et al., 1982)6. Interestingly, the transition from familiarity to 
novelty preferences after sufﬁ  cient habituation is not gradual: if 
habituation is interrupted immediately before infants would begin 
to show novelty preferences, they exhibit familiarity preferences 
of an equal magnitude to those at the beginning of habituation 
(Roder et al., 2000).
One might also expect from this discussion that during the proc-
ess of a proper familiarization to criterion, infants would show 
an initial increase in looking time to the habituation stimulus, 
followed by a decline. Typically, however, habituation curves are 
monotonically decreasing. There are two potential reasons for the 
apparent lack of an initial increase. First, infants may exhibit generic 
decreases in responsiveness across trials that may mask an initial 
increase. In other words, looking time may decline between the ﬁ  rst 
and second habituation trials, but nevertheless be enhanced rela-
tive to the looking time to a hypothetical novel stimulus. Second, 
averaging looking times over all infants in a sample may actually 
obscure initial increases. In other words, if some infants habituate 
immediately, while others habituate more slowly, any enhanced 
responses in the slow habituators would be obliterated by the 
already habituated responses of the fast habituators. To address 
this problem, several studies have aligned backwards from the point 
at which each infant reaches the habituation criterion (e.g. Cohen 
and Gelber, 1975; Roder et al., 2000). And consistent with the view 
sketched above, these studies observe that responses to familiar 
stimuli are enhanced immediately prior to reaching criterion (the 
point at which infants are exhibiting reliable novelty preferences). 
Interestingly, in adults, the transition from familiarity to novelty 
preferences can occur quickly during online processing: during 
individual test trials of a visual paired comparison task, observers 
tend to look ﬁ  rst at the familiar stimulus and subsequently at the 
novel stimulus (Snyder et al., 2008).
In functional neuroimaging, the likelihood of observing rep-
etition enhancement vs. attenuation depends on several factors, 
6Some studies have also observed increased looking to familiar stimuli after 
habituation to criterion (Bertenthal et al., 1983). However, such increases are judged 
relative to the most recent pre-criterion looking times, and are believed to reﬂ  ect 
spontaneous regression. Thus, to assess true preferences, it is necessary to compare 
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including stimulus exposure time (Grill-Spector et  al., 2000), 
image quality (Dolan et al., 1997), and discriminability (Kourtzi 
et al., 2005) – all of which plausibly affect the quality of the result-
ing representation. For example, in the study mentioned above 
in which unfamiliar faces and line drawings produced repetition 
enhancement, familiar versions of the same stimuli (famous faces 
or common symbols) produced repetition attenuation in the same 
brain region (Henson et al., 2000), presumably because robust rep-
resentations of these familiar stimuli already existed. More directly, 
the amount of information that can be extracted from a single 
stimulus exposure determines whether enhancement or attenua-
tion will be observed when the stimulus is ﬁ  rst repeated. For exam-
ple, in the parahippocampal place area (PPA; Aguirre et al., 1998; 
Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998), the repetition of low-visibility scene 
photographs elicited repetition enhancement, while the repetition 
of clearly visible scene photographs elicited repetition attenuation 
(Turk-Browne et al., 2007). Unlike looking-time habituation, the 
timecourse of the transition from repetition enhancement to rep-
etition attenuation is unknown. This is an important question for 
future research, since null results in repetition designs may reﬂ  ect 
an intermediate stage of habituation. Interestingly, after extensive 
habituation, repetition attenuation begins to saturate, and eventu-
ally decline (Zago et al., 2005).
Moreover, initial increases in responsiveness (sensitization) 
followed by sustained decreases (habituation) are commonplace 
in various animal behaviors, including hindlimb ﬂ  exion in cats 
following skin shocks, the startle response in rats following loud 
tones, and skin conductance in humans also following loud tones 
(Groves and Thompson, 1970). In these cases, sensitization is pro-
portional to the intensity of the stimulus, and reﬂ  ects excitability 
of the evoked response. However, these effects are transient and 
non-speciﬁ  c to the habituating stimulus. What makes the anal-
ogy between infant looking times and hemodynamic responses 
particularly interesting is that the transition from enhancement to 
attenuation may occur for the same underlying reason (as described 
above), reﬂ  ecting stimulus-speciﬁ  c learning. Since similar effects 
in other behaviors and physiological responses are not stimulus-
speciﬁ  c, such an explanation could not apply.
In sum, enhanced responses to repeated stimuli seem to occur for 
the same types of reasons in both infant cognition and functional 
neuroimaging – and these similarities fuel speculation that common 
representational dynamics may be involved. While many results in 
the two literatures are consistent with these ideas, it will certainly be 
worth directly testing this hypothesis in future studies.
EXPLORING THE ANALOGY
The primary goal of this paper has been to highlight an analogy 
between certain phenomena, methods, results, and mechanisms 
from two very different literatures. This alone seems worthwhile: 
the points of connection between habituation as it is used in infant 
cognition and functional neuroimaging are remarkable, despite the 
fact that these two phenomena have not been previously connected 
in this way. But the hope is that this analogy could itself facilitate 
progress in each area, and serve as a novel type of case study of how 
neuroscience and infant cognition may usefully interact.
Perhaps the most obvious way to pursue this interaction would 
be to empirically compare and contrast looking time novelty 
  preferences and fMRI repetition attenuation in the same popula-
tion. At present, exploring fMRI repetition attenuation in young 
infants poses considerable methodological challenges, including 
generic problems of head-motion and loud noise in the scanner, as 
well as the likelihood that such factors would themselves inﬂ  uence 
looking-time responses. As technology advances and new method-
ologies are developed, however, it may become feasible to obtain 
reliable fMRI data from young infants – in which case it would be 
fascinating to explore neural responses in the infant brain to the 
same displays that have been used in looking-time studies7.
The alternative – obtaining looking-time data from adults – is 
also methodologically challenging, for equally important but more 
abstract reasons. The goal of such a comparison would be to study 
the same underlying processes in both infants and adults. In gen-
eral, however, it is rarely possible to achieve this goal in differ-
ent populations by employing identical stimuli; instead, studying 
the same processes in two populations often requires using very 
different displays and tools, since the same displays would bring 
online different types of processes and strategies for the different 
populations. This possibility is clear in the present context, since 
adults’ looking times – especially to the kinds of simple displays 
that are characteristic of infant looking-time studies – would surely 
reﬂ  ect many different processes beyond those active in infants. For 
example, when viewing such displays adults’ looking times would 
be inﬂ  uenced by their higher-level questions about how the experi-
menters managed to create a seemingly-impossible event, what 
the experiment is testing, etc. As a result, studies of adult looking 
behavior in simple displays have not typically been able to obtain 
meaningful results from looking time per se, and have focused 
instead on where adults will ﬁ  rst ﬁ  xate upon initially encountering 
a possibly-repeated display (e.g. Manns et al., 2000; Snyder et al., 
2008). More generally, the displays used in infant studies may sufﬁ  ce 
to attract infants’ attention repeatedly, but more complex displays 
may be required to obtain meaningful looking time data from 
adults (e.g. Ryan et al., 2007). Thus, equating the same underlying 
processing in these populations might actually require quite dif-
ferent paradigms and displays.
Though comparisons of these two forms of habituation in the 
same population resist straightforward empirical testing, such com-
parisons can nevertheless suggest potentially useful future direc-
tions. We conclude by noting four such possibilities:
First, beyond the connections noted above, these literatures are 
each quite rich, and each contains many manipulations and ques-
tions that could be usefully imported into the other. In this way, the 
analogy could be of great heuristic use, by suggesting new questions 
for each domain. For example, the role of attention in habituation 
has been treated very differently in the two literatures. In func-
tional neuroimaging, attention is manipulated via task demands 
and is typically characterized in terms of resources (e.g. Pessoa 
7There is also a smaller literature on repetition effects in adults as measured by EEG 
(e.g. Henson et al., 2004; Puce et al., 1999). Such methods are in some cases more 
amenable to pediatric samples than fMRI, and thus may be well suited to examining 
neural repetition effects in infants (e.g. Southgate et al., 2008; Wiebe et al., 2006). 
Repetition effects of this sort may thus provide an additional measure of habituation 
and dishabituation in infants that can be related to looking times (e.g. Snyder and 
Keil, in press), and may also help researchers explore how perceptual representations 
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et al., 2002) and selection (e.g. O’Craven et al., 1999). Although 
fMRI habituation is relatively implicit and automatic – such that 
it can occur despite depleted resources (Yi et al., 2004) – selective 
attention is nevertheless required (Eger et al., 2004; Murray and 
Wojciulik, 2004; Vuilleumier et al., 2005; Yi and Chun, 2005). In 
infant cognition, attention is often characterized in terms of pas-
sive states of arousal, for example as measured by heart rates (e.g. 
Richards, 1997) and manipulated by feeding (e.g. Geva et al., 1999). 
These states of arousal affect the rate of habituation: after equivalent 
amounts of exposure, infants exhibit novelty preferences during 
sustained attention and after feeding, but familiarity preferences 
during casual attention and prior to feeding (Geva et al., 1999; 
Richards, 1997). It may be worthwhile to import these different 
notions of attention into each domain. For example, we know of 
no direct research in functional neuroimaging on the relationship 
between arousal and habituation. One promising approach may 
be to examine how low-frequency shifts in the fMRI signal – that 
are believed to reﬂ  ect arousal (Chawla et al., 1999) and other cog-
nitive states (Leber et al., 2008) – inﬂ  uence repetition attenuation 
(Turk-Browne et al., 2006).
Second, the exploration of this analogy could help to elucidate 
the underlying cognitive processes that are involved in mediating 
various types of habituation. In functional neuroimaging, for exam-
ple, habituation has been interpreted with regard to different forms 
of memory depending on the lag between repetitions: attenuated 
responses to repetitions after minimal delays or interruption may 
reﬂ  ect short-term transient changes in stimulus-speciﬁ  c processing, 
while attenuated responses to repetitions over signiﬁ  cant delays and 
interruption may result from long-term learning (see Grill-Spector 
et al., 2006; Henson, 2003). In contrast, habituation in infant cogni-
tion has often been interpreted in terms of the exercise of explicit 
knowledge (e.g. Spelke, 1988) vs. implicit visual processing (e.g. 
Cheries et al., in press; Feigenson et al., 2002; Scholl and Leslie, 
1999), and has been related to constructs from vision science, such 
as “object ﬁ  les” (e.g. Carey and Xu, 2001; Cheries et al., 2006; Chiang 
and Wynn, 2000; Feigenson et al., 2002; Scholl and Leslie, 1999). 
Thus, it could be of use in each area to consider explanations based 
on constructs from the other. For example, the ﬁ  nding that looking-
time habituation can persist across interruptions by a small number 
but not a larger number of novel moving objects was interpreted in 
terms of object ﬁ  les (Cheries et al., 2006), but could also be inter-
preted in terms of working memory processes, which are similarly 
capacity-limited. Likewise, while neural repetition effects decline 
as the lag between repetitions increases (Henson et al., 2004), no 
research has examined whether such effects are sensitive to the 
complexity of the intervening items per se.
Third, our understanding of habituation itself may be enhanced 
by considering the analogy, since different kinds of models have 
been developed for infant and neural habituation. For example, 
detailed computational models of infant habituation (e.g. Schoner 
and Thelen, 2006; Sirois and Mareschal, 2002) could perhaps be sup-
plemented by the neurophysiological accounts of habituation and its 
consequences that have been invoked in functional neuroimaging, 
including notions of fatigue (as often invoked in infant habitua-
tion), but also learning-related representational changes that result 
in speeded processing and increased selectivity (see Desimone, 1996; 
Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Wiggs and Martin, 1998). In particular, 
increased selectivity and hence reduced neuronal responses may bias 
competition for limited processing resources to novel stimuli, which 
evoke larger responses (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; cf. Snyder 
et al., 2008). In turn, the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying 
repetition attenuation are relatively unknown (e.g. Sawamura et al., 
2006), but may depend heavily on competitive interactions between 
neurons that are initially broadly-tuned (see Grill-Spector et al., 
2006); such ideas, often invoked at the level of mental representa-
tions, are an important component of models of infant habituation 
and development (e.g. Johnson, 2000; Westermann et al., 2007). 
Thus, an integration of models in the two domains could help us 
understand the dynamics of habituation in each case.
Fourth, it remains possible that that these two forms of habitua-
tion, despite their differences, may reﬂ  ect the same types of underly-
ing processes. In this case, exploring the analogy noted here could lead 
not only to progress in each area due to the heuristic consideration of 
ideas and models from the other area, but could perhaps unite these 
two domains. To accomplish this, both forms of habituation could be 
used as tools to study the same topics, with the goal of evaluating how 
similar the results are. For example, stimulus identity in functional 
neuroimaging (especially of ventral cortex) is typically evaluated in 
terms of featural and categorical information, whereas identity in 
infant cognition has often been evaluated with regard to spatiotem-
poral continuity (regardless of surface features; see Flombaum et al., 
in press). The analogy noted here, however, suggests that it might 
thus be useful to investigate both of these ideas with fMRI habitu-
ation. And when this was actually done, in fact, the FFA and the 
LOC were sensitive to both types of “sameness”: in dynamic motion 
displays, repetition attenuation was observed only when featurally-
identical faces were repeated along a spatiotemporally continuous 
path (Yi et al., 2008). This provides a new way to think about how 
featural and spatiotemporal information are combined.
It is our hope that attending to this analogy could help us under-
stand the nature and dynamics of habituation in each ﬁ  eld, and 
ultimately help us appreciate the meaning of these similarities across 
such different areas of cognitive science, as a type of case study of how 
neuroscience and infant cognition may be mutually informative.
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